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Article 2

Ethical Issues in the Use of Asystolic
Donors
by
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D.

The author is Professor of Pediatrics, Loyola University School of Medicine
and Director, Linacre Institute of the Catholic Medical Association

The modern era of allogenic organ transplantation began in the mid
1960s. Then, improvement in surgical techniques, understanding of
immunologic tolerance, and the development of drugs to control
rejection expanded the technical feasibility of transplantation procedures.
To some this represented a "crisis of success" as there was a resultant
increase in demand for organs without a parallel increase in supply.
According to the United Network for Organ Sharing' database there are
now 75,000 patients waiting for an organ. Among those waiting for a
heart or liver transplant approximately 113 will die before an organ
becomes available. 2 The primary source of donor organs will be those
who have had an irreversible cessation of total brain function and who
are being maintained on ventilators in intensive care units. These are
commonly called Heart Beating Cadaver Donors and will constitute a
pool of 10,000-12,000 potential donors per year. Despite extensive public
awareness campaigns, the ratio of actual to potential donors has not
increased sufficiently. One response has been to attempt a greater
reliance on living donors (kidneys) partial transplants (liver and lungs)
and sources of dubious ethical propriety such as anencephalic infants 3
and animals. 4
Another potential source of transplantable organs is patients who
have been declared dead by traditional cardiopulmonary, rather than
brain-based criteria. These are referred to as Non-Heart Beating Cadaver
Donors. The success of transplants using organs from these sources has
been limited by problems with warm ischemia. Two recent strategies to
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circumvent the problem of warm ischemia l are in situ preservation
following uncontrolled pulmonary arrest and 2 procurement from patients
who have died after choosing to forego life-support treatment. Both of
these methods of procuring organs from Non-Heart Beating Cadaver
Donors (NHBCD) have posed a new array of ethical problems related to l
ethical issues related to the definition of death 2 potential conflicts of
interest and 3 acceptable behavior in controlling the dying process 4 the
consent process for procurement. 5
The major problem with organs taken from NHBCD is the
deterioration of organs from warm ischemia. This is resultant from the
prolonged period between the declaration of death following aseptole and
the process of removing organs. Two approaches have been suggested:
1. Uncontrolled Cardiopulmonary Death
These are usually patients who are brought to an emergency room
and die as a result of myocardial infarction or mUltiple traumas. To avoid
warm ischemia a balloon catheter is inserted and inflated above and
below the renal arteries and the kidneys are cooled by an infusion of cold
preservative solution through this catheter and cannulas inserted through
the abdominal wall.
Because of difficulty in obtaining consent from families
overwhelmed by the circumstances of a sudden unanticipated demise, the
Organ Bank of Illinois has proposed that the insertion of cannulas for
installation of preservative solutions be carried out prior to asking for
family consent. This is based on an experience of greater likelihood of
getting consent if catheters are already in place and approaches to
families are therefore less urgent.
Despite disclaimers that inserting catheters are non-deforming or
non-mutilating,6 there is a great deal of concern about proceeding
without family consent. There is little consensus about the morality of
performing invasive procedures on dead patients to benefit others. At a
minimum they are disrespectful of the dead, disregard family input and
foster unwanted attitudes in medical staff. 7

2. Controlled Timing and Place of Death
This method is what has become commonly known as the
Pittsburgh Protocol. Under this protocol families who have decided to
forego life support may be approached to donate organs. The decision to
stop life support should in all instances precede the decision to donate.
This allows time for discussion before any invasive procedure and the
time and location of death are controlled. Warm ischemia time is
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minimized by taking the patient to the operating room before organs are
removed immediately after pronouncement of death.
For purposes of discussion, it will be assumed that the decision to
stop the ventilator is appropriate given the circumstances of patient's
terminal condition. The family must give fully informed consent to 1)
placement of a femoral artery catheter to measure pulse pressure, 2)
declaration of death following absence of pulse pressure when the
ventilator is removed, 3) removal of organs after death is declared 4) If
removal of life support does not result in death of the patient "in a very
short time", the procedure will be cancelled and the patient returned to
intensive care.
Death is declared after 1) two minutes of ventricular fibrillation 2) two
minutes of asystole or 3) two minutes of electromechanical dissociation.

Ethical Issues
A fundamental question is whether increasing the number of
transplants deserves to be a priority in a time of scarce resources. 9 To
what extent is the attempt to increase the number of donor organs
influenced by the increase in the number of surgeons and institutions
performing transplantation and the need to increase the funding of
centers whose prestige, opportunities for training and funding for
research depend on increasing the number of operations done? Public
perception of motives other than saving lives might undermine the
acceptance of dramatic programs to increase NHBCD.
Issues Regarding Defining and/or Hastening Death
Criteria for death using brain-based standards have constantly and
incontrovertibly focused on irreversibility both in statutory and clinical
definitions. Irreversibility confirms death to reinforce certainly that death
is final with no hope of recovery. The Uniform Determination of Death
Act states "An individual who has sustained either 1) irreversible cessation
of respiratory and circulatory functions or 2) irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain including the brain stem is dead. A
determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical
standards." This standard has been enacted into statutes in most states.
The concept of irreversibility has been defined as "a lost function
cannot be restored by anyone, under any circumstances at any time now
or in the future." A less categorical definition states "the loss of function
cannot be reversed by those present at this time." 'o
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Under the Pittsburgh Protocol, death is declared after two minutes
when the failure to restore cardiac function will result not from a lack of
present means, but from a decision not to use them. The patient who has
qualified as NHBCD may be in a state when organs are removed where it
might be possible to restore function, but a decision has been made not to
attempt to do so. This raises questions as to whether the Pittsburgh
protocol fulfills the criterion of irreversibility. Defenders of the protocol
argue that irreversibility should be determined by an inability to
autoresuscitate. It is customary to declare those patients dead who have
Do Not Resuscitate Orders and who arrest when we have no plans to
resuscitate them. There are no data to confirm that autoresuscitate is
impossible after the two minutes allowed in the Pittsburgh Protocol.
Shewmon II has suggested a longer period of 20 minutes but he also lacks
data to confirm a more prolonged period of observation precluding
autoresuscitation.
How does adding the goal of procuring organs affect the morality
of the situation? Is it possible to be confident that the goal of acquiring
viable organs does not affect decisions made in the best interest of the
dying patient?
Will the use of narcotics to control pain be altered when organ
harvesting is anticipated? Will the decision to discontinue life support be
derivative of the anticipated organ donation despite scrupulous attempts
to separate the decision to stop the respirator from the decision to donate
organs? Is it possible, in other words, to be sure that the decision to
shorten life will not be influenced by the reality that death is to occur in a
fashion that produces viable organs?
It will be difficult for families and health care personnel to avoid
the impression that the death is staged or even ceremonial. There will be
emotional consequences for those who must say their farewells to a
conscious or unconscious patient who is then wheeled to the operating
room to die among strangers who have heretofore not participated in his
care. It would be possible to insert femoral catheters in the intensive care
unit and then remove life support prior to taking the patient to the
operating room. It is questionable whether this would ameliorate
emotional reactions or actually aggravate them by mixing patient care
and transplant procedures inseparably.

The Consent Process
When the strategy of the health care team is directed toward
increasing the number of transplantable organs, the consent process may
be altered. It is usually assumed that both the donor and the next of kin
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would agree to the donation. In practice, different organ procurement
organizations proceed differentlyY 19% follow the deceased's wishes,
19% follow the next of kin's wishes, 10% proceed if neither party objects
and 8% proceed if either party consents or neither objects. The
availability of a Durable Power of Attorney or a Living Will could
strongly affect the decision. There is seemingly no national consensus as
to what constitutes valid consent. Clear direction from an advanced
directive or a unanimous agreement between patient and family would
seem to constitute a minimum requirement for most hospital settings in
contrast with Organ Procurement Organizations' policies.
Public Policy Considerations

While a heroic attempt has been made in the Pittsburgh Protocol to
protect the best interests of donors and to separate caregivers and
transplant teams rigorously, the pervasive atmosphere, rightly or
wrongly, is to guarantee an increase in available donor organs. In an
institution that identifies itself as a "transplantation center" and in which
the salutary goal of saving lives of critically ill patients pervades the
environment, strict standards will be vulnerable to "end justifies the
means" rationales. Although under the common law, no one has a
property interest in a dead body 13, a limited interest in a corpse resides
with the next of kin who are expected to arrange for the disposition of the
remains. A pre-mortem decision to donate one's organs is not binding on
next of kin. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act adopted in all states, made
it possible for an individual to make an anatomic gift, which would take
effect upon death. This was followed by the Uniform Determination of
Death Act to clarify the dead donor rule, now operative in 47 states. The
National Organ Transplant Act in 1984 established a mechanism for
finding donors and prioritizing recipients. This system, not surprisingly,
has not achieved the goal of matching organ supply with demand. The
shortfall using brain-based criteria to qualify heart beating cadaver
donors (HBCD) has further encouraged the development of protocols for
non-heart beating cadaver donors (NHBCD).
The very sensitive background to these strategies is the public's
confidence in the process. If the public perceives that the motivation is
self-interest rather than life saving, the end result might be a decrease
rather than an increase in the availability of transplantable organs.
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Summary

Programs for the use of Non Heart Beating Cadaver Donors are
subject to a variety of ethical concerns: 14
1) Are these programs using new and invalidated criteria for determining
death?
2) Is the dying process being engineered to accommodate the need for
more usable organs?
3) Are rules for consent being manipulated to accomplish this same end?
4) Are invasive procedures being carried out on recently dead patients
without consent of near relatives and what are the ethical and possible
legal consequences?
5) Are there alterations which are possibly harmful in the case of the
terminally ill patient?
6) Will the mourning process be affected in perhaps a long-term adverse
way, by the contrived removal of the patient to the operating room prior
to discontinuing life support?
7) Will the decision tu discontinue life support be affected?

Until NHBCD programs can be evaluated for impact on concepts
of Life vs . death, active vs. passive hastening of death and interests of
dying patients vs. interests of organ recipients, the medical professions
must proceed with extreme caution. Much of what is proposed is
counterintentive and public backlashes a definite risk. In the meanwhile,
much of the ambivalence about the propriety of the use of brain-based
criteria has been clarified if not settled by Pope John Paul II on August
29, 2000, in his address to the International Congress on Transplants. A
portion of the text of his address is appended to this document. In this
highly significant statement Pope John Paul II said that the use of brainbased criteria for "ascertaining the fact of death" does not conflict with
"the essential elements of a sound anthropology." He also said that
"health workers responsible for ascertaining death can use these criterion
in individual cases with that degree of assurance in ethical judgment
which moral teaching describes as 'moral certainty'."
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With this kind of endorsement of brain-based criteria for
determining death, it is difficult to justify entering into the murky waters
of using asystolic donors.

Appendix - John Paul II on Neurologic Criteria
The following is a portion of Pope John Paul II 's "Address to the
International Congress on Transplants" , August 29, 2000.

When Does Death Occur?
Acknowledgment of the unique dignity of the human person has a
further underlying consequence: vital organs which occur singly in the
body can be removed only after death, that is from the body of someone
who is certainly dead. This requirement is self-evident, since to act
otherwise would mean intentionally to cause the death of the donor in
disposing of his organs. This gives rise to one of the most debated issues
in contemporary bioethics, as well as to serious concerns in the minds of
ordinary people. I refer to the problem of ascertaining the fact of death.
When can a person be considered dead with complete certainty?
In this regard it is helpful to recall that the death of the person is a
single event, consisting in the total disintegration of that unitary and
integrated whole that is the personal self. It results from the separation of
the life principle (or soul) from the corporal reality of the person. The
death of the person, understood in this primary sense, is an event which
no scientific technique or empirical method can identify directly.
Yet human experience shows that once death occurs certain
biological signs inevitably follow, which medicine has learnt to
recognize with increasing precision. In this sense, the "criteria" for
ascertaining death used by medicine today should not be understood as
the technical scientific determination of the exact moment of a person 's
death, but as a scientifically secure means of identifying the biological
signs that a person has indeed died.

Neurological Criteria Accepted
It is a well-known fact that for some time certain scientific approaches
to ascertaining death have shifted the emphasis from the traditional cardiorespiratory signs to the so called "neurological" criterion. Specifically,
this consists in establishing, according to clearly determined parameters
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commonly held by the international scientific community, the complete
and irreversible cessation of all brain activity (in the cerebrum,
cerebellum and brain stem). This is then considered the sign that the
individual organism has lost its integrative capacity.
With regard to the parameters used today for ascertaining death whether the "encephalic" signs or the more traditional cardio-respiratory
signs - the Church does not make technical decisions. She limits herself
to the Gospel duty of comparing the data offered by medical science with
the Christian understanding of the unity of the person, bringing out the
similarities and the possible conflicts capable of endangering respect for
human dignity.
Here it can be said that the criterion adopted in more recent times
for ascertaining the fact of death, namely the complete and irreversible
cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously applied, does not seem to
conflict with the essential elements of a sound anthropology. Therefore a
health worker professionally responsible for ascertaining death can use
these criteria in each individual case as the basis for arriving at that
degree of assurance in ethical judgment which moral teaching describes
as "moral certainty." This moral certainty is considered the necessary and
sufficient basis for an ethically correct course of action. Only where such
certainty exists, and where informed consent has already been given by
the donor or the donor's legitimate representatives, is it morally right to
initiate the technical procedures required for the removal of organs for
transplant.
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